U.S. 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals, February 16, 2010
US v. $22,050.00
US Currency, No. 08-6335
In an in rem forfeiture action in connection with a drug distribution
and money laundering investigation wherein the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration seized $22,050 from petitioner's office,
judgment of the district court denying his motion to set aside default
and entry of judgment in favor of the United States is reversed where:
1) in civil forfeiture cases such as this one, where the question is
whether to excuse a known claimant's failure to file a verified claim
and answer in the allotted time, district courts should analyze the
case using the generally applicable Federal Rules (Rule 55(c)) rather
than under the appellate court's requirement of "strict compliance"
with the forfeiture rules; 2) the government would not have been
prejudiced by setting aside the default; 3) claimant has asserted
meritorious defenses to the forfeiture claim; and 4) on remand, it must
be determined whether claimant was culpable under Rule 55(c) for the
default by willfully fail! ing to appear and plead. Read more...
U.S. 5th Circuit
Court of Appeals, December 17, 2009 U.S. 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals, October 27, 2009 U.S. 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals, October 26, 2009
U.S. 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals, November 19, 2009 U.S. 8th Circuit
Court of Appeals, November 18, 2009
US v. $500,000
in US Currency, No. 08-20579
In an asset forfeiture proceeding in which a company claiming to be the
rightful owner of the funds at issue objected and filed a claim
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 983, dismissal of the claim for lack of
standing is reversed where: 1) the pleadings alleged that claimant
owned the actual seized dollars; and 2) the evidence claimant attached
to its response to the government's motion to dismiss supported the
pleadings' allegations.Read more...
US v.
Venturella, No. 07-3754
District court's conviction of defendants for mail fraud and order to
pay a criminal forfeiture money judgment and restitution is affirmed
as: 1) forfeiture is not limited solely to the amounts alleged in the
count(s) of conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(1)(C); 2)
defendants waived their rights to forfeiture calculations review on
appeal; and 3) imposing restitution and forfeiture for the same crime
is not an improper double payment. Read more...
US v. Velez, No.
09-10199
In the government's appeal from a district court's dismissal of a money
laundering charge against defendants, the order is affirmed where
monetary transactions made for the purpose of securing legal
representation are exempt from criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C.
section 1957(f)(1). Read more...
US v. Miller,
No. 09-2256
District court's order to destroy 34 firearms and for defendant to
collect just compensation from the government arising from his
conviction of aiding and abetting the possession of firearms by a
felon, is vacated and remanded where: 1) because the government did not
commence a timely forfeiture proceeding, defendant's property interest
in the firearms continues even though his possessory interest has been
curtailed; and 2) as such, if the government does not want to sell the
firearms for his account, then it must offer defendant some other
lawful option, such as having a trustee sell or hold the guns, or
giving them to someone who can be relied on to treat them as his own. Read more...
US v. Moser, No.
08-2909
In a petition for attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) after petitioner prevailed in an asset
forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(n), denial of
the petition is affirmed where the arguments for and against permitting
a prevailing section 853(n) petitioner to receive attorneys' fees from
the government were too closely balanced to allow the court of appeals
to conclude that Congress's waiver of sovereign immunity clearly and
unequivocally applied in this situation. Read more...
12/2/09 federal rules
amendments: As of today, the Criminal Procedure and Appellate Procedure Rules
have been changed so that there is no such thing as not counting
weekends and holidays. Only calendar days matter. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(B) and Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(B). This change required
changing all the references to time limits of 11 days or less [which
previously did not count weekends and holidays]. So for the most
part all time limits of 10 days are now 14 days, e.g. for notices of
appeal. This could make a difference when previously you would
get an extra day when there was a holiday mixed within the 10
days. Also, the time to file post-verdict motions for acquittal
and new trial and post-judgment motions to correct clear error have
changed from 7 to 14 days. Time to respond to appellate motions
has changed from 8 to 10 days. Reply briefs must be filed within
7 rather than 3 days of oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 26(c)
clarifies that the 3 days for mailing after service of a document
[which applies unless the document is hand-delivered] begins to run
only after the date you determine the response would have been due
absent the extra three days. Other changes to the criminal procedure rules: Rule 41 specifies
that a warrant may authorize the seizure of electronic media and that,
unless otherwise stated, that kind of warrant is assumed to allow for a
later review of the information in the media. The time for
executing the warrant does not restrict when later off-site reviews
must be conducted. The inventory may just refer to the "physical
storage media" that was seized, not the information found within it. Rule 32(G) requires the presentence report to specify whether the
government seeks forfeiture. Rule 32.2 has been amended with
respect to how criminal forfeiture proceedings should be
conducted and it states that notice of forfeiture in the indictment
should not be designated as a count and need not identify the property
or money amount subject to forfeiture.
U.S. 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals, August 25, 2009 U.S. 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals, August 24, 2009 U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, August 26, 2009
U.S. 11th Circuit
Court of Appeals, August 19, 2009
US v. Certain
Real Prop., No. 08-14334
In the government's appeal from an attorney's fee award following the
dismissal of the government's civil forfeiture action, the award is
reversed where attorney's fees incurred in the defense of a criminal
action may not be awarded in a related civil forfeiture action under
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 without regard for the
stringent limitations on attorney-fee awards in criminal cases under
the Hyde Amendment. Read more...
US v. Salti, No.
07-4487
In an appeal from a dismissal of a petition asserting an interest in a
bank account the court had ordered forfeited as a result of the
government's plea agreement with one petitioner's nephew, the order is
reversed where a petitioner's alleged ill health is clearly relevant to
whether the petitioner is deliberately avoiding prosecution by
declining to enter or reenter the U.S., and such an argument is
properly asserted in response to the government's attempt to apply the
fugitive disentitlement statute. Read more...
US v. Marrocco,
No. 07-3101
In forfeiture proceedings involving cash that was suspected to be
connected to drugs, district court's grant of defendant's motion to
suppress dog-sniff test evidence is reversed and remanded where: 1) the
police officers' suspicion that a briefcase contained drugs or money
associated with drugs was reasonable; 2) detention of the briefcase was
reasonable; and 3) officer's unlawful search of the briefcase fell
under under the inevitable discovery doctrine where the government
obtained an independent legal justification for conducting a search
which led to the discovery of the evidence and officers inevitably
would have sought the warrant and conducted a lawful search.Read more...
US v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067
In cases arising from the federal investigation of the Bay Area Lab
Cooperative (Balco) and its alleged distribution of illegal steroids to
professional baseball athletes, orders quashing subpoenas seeking
information regarding drug tests performed on baseball players are
affirmed over the government's appeal where: 1) the government failed
to timely appeal one of the orders, which determined that the
government failed to segregate intermingled data, and thus the order
had preclusive effect on the other pending cases; and 2) Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(g) was an appropriate means of obtaining the return of property
improperly seized by the government. Read more...
The SEC's complaint,
filed in U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota, alleges that Gregory Bell and Lancelot Management LLC
invested more than $2 billion in hedge funds assets with Petters and
pocketed millions of dollars in fraudulent fees at the expense of
investors in the funds. The SEC's complaint also charges Petters with
fraud for perpetrating the massive Ponzi scheme through the sale of
notes related to consumer electronics. When Petters's scheme began to
unravel, Bell participated in a series of sham transactions to conceal
that Petters owed more than $130 million in investor payments on the
notes.
Petters was previously
charged with an alleged $3.5 billion dollar
Ponzi scheme by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota in
early October 2008, and his assets were frozen at that time. But rather
than obtaining a pre-indictment restraining order under 21 U.S.C.
853(e)(1)(B),
the government claimed much broader powers by using 18 U.S.C. 1345, the
"fraud injunction" statute. Section 1345(a)(2) is not a forfeiture
statute. It is easier to obtain and, in contrast to forfeiture
statutes that require the government must first give notice and an
opportunity for a hearing
to persons appearing to have an interest in the property, section
1345(a)(2) permits the government to obtain a temporary restraining
order ex parte--without
notice or opportunity for secured creditors to intervene.
A forfeiture restraint
order under 853 is only effective for up to
90 days unless extended by court for good cause or unless an indictment
or information alleging forfeiture is files. But section 1345(a)(s)
places no time limit on the duration of a preliminary or permanent
injunction or restraining order. Former head of the Department of
Justice' asset forfeiture division, David Smith writes in Prosecution
and Defense of Forfeture cases:
D.
C.
Docket No. 05-00307-CR-T-24-MSS UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARSHA
LYNN HOFFMAN-VAILE, Defendant-Appellant. May 27, 2009
D. The District Court Erred When It
Calculated the Amount of the Forfeiture
Money Judgment.
Dr. Hoffman-Vaile argues that the district court erred when it calculated the forfeiture amount because it included the losses to private insurance companies and patients. “The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of a Federal health care offense, shall order the person to forfeit property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7). Dr. Hoffman-Vaile argues that she “can only be ordered to repay proceeds that resulted from Medicare
20
fraud[,]” and “[a]ny amounts that she received from private insurance companies or other payors did not result from Medicare fraud.” Because she has been ordered to pay restitution to the other victims, she argues that she should not be required to forfeit that amount to the government as well. This argument fails. The amounts that Dr. Hoffman-Vaile received from private insurance companies and patients are “gross proceeds traceable to the commission of” her fraud because, but for her Medicare fraud, she would not have been entitled to collect these sums from the companies and patients. See id. We are not persuaded by Dr. Hoffman-Vaile’s argument that her forfeiture amount should be reduced because she has paid restitution to the other victims. Although “this might appear to be a ‘double dip,’ restitution and forfeiture serve different goals[.]” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 793 n.8 (7th Cir. 2006). “[T]he focus of restitution is on the victim, [but] forfeiture focuses on the defendant.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). “In addition to forcing the disgorgement of dishonest profits, therefore, forfeiture is also a punitive action against the defendant.” Id. The district court did not err when it included in the forfeiture amount the sums paid by Dr. Hoffman-Vaile’s other victims, the private insurance companies and her patients. Although the district court used the correct methodology, it miscalculated the amount of the forfeiture money judgment, as the
21
government concedes. We vacate the judgment of forfeiture to allow the district court to correct the forfeiture amount from $705,161.87 to $695,742.96.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Dr. Hoffman-Vaile’s convictions and sentences, except that we VACATE the forfeiture money judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 07-12629
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00307-CR-T-24-MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARSHA LYNN HOFFMAN-VAILE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(May 27, 2009)
Before BLACK,
22
Stevens
v. US, No. 08-1283
In proceedings arising from a criminal prosecution, denial of
petitioner's motion to return property is affirmed where: 1) the
government met its burden of showing that it was no longer in
possession of the items seized; 2) there is no presumption of
untruthfulness in a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) proceeding; and 3) defendant
may not challenge his conviction by way of a Rule 41(g) motion. Read more...
US
v. Harrell, No. 07-10238
In a case involving unauthorized viewing of satellite television and
the government's seizure of certain digital satellite television
receivers and other hardware and software, partial denial of
defendant's motion for return of property filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) is affirmed in part and reversed in
part where: 1) there must be a change to either the hardware or
software of a telecommunications instrument that makes it more capable
of obtaining unauthorized signals in order for it to be "modified or
altered" under 18 U.S.C. section 1029(a)(7); 2) under such standard,
certain receivers at issue were not modified or altered so as to
constitute contraband per se; and 3) some other hardware and software
was also not shown to constitute contraband per se. Read more...
This is an excellent decision! Third parties whose property is
seized in criminal forfeiture cases have few procedural rights.
When the government opts to process the case as a criminal
forfeiture, third parties have to just sit and wait until the criminal
prosecution is over before being given any due process at all.
Based
on precedents holding that third party proceedings under 21 U.S.C.
§853(n) are civil in nature, this district court opinion held that
such proceedings qualify for CAFRA attorney's fees.
541 F. Supp. 2d
794; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25068, *
UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, v. BRUNO CAVELIER D'ESCLAVELLES, Defendant, PETR
BUK, Petitioner.
CASE NO. 1:06cr235
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
541 F. Supp. 2d
794; 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25068
March 25, 2008,
Decided
March 25, 2008,
Entered
COUNSEL: [*1]
For Gov't: Karen Ledbetter Taylor , Assistant United States Attorney.
For Defense: Daniel
T. McNamara, Steven J. McCool , Mallon & McCool, LLC, Washington,
D.C.
JUDGES: Gerald
Bruce Lee , United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: Gerald
Bruce Lee
OPINION
AMENDED MEMORANDUM
ORDER
THIS MATTER is
before the Court on Petitioner Petr Buk's Motion for Attorneys' Fees.
This motion follows a successful suit by the Petitioner to recover
funds from a bank account the government seized from third parties in a
criminal forfeiture proceeding. There are two issues before the Court:
(1) whether the attorneys' fees provisions of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA") granting attorneys' fees and costs to a
prevailing claimant in "any civil proceeding to forfeit property under
any provision of Federal law" applies to the Petitioner where he has
prevailed in an action under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), a section of a
criminal forfeiture statute that allows innocent owners to petition for
the return of assets seized from third parties; and (2) if the Court
determines CAFRA's attorneys' fees provision is applicable, whether $
17,322.50 is a reasonable award. The Court grants Plaintiff's Motion
for Attorneys' Fees and awards Petitioner attorneys' [*2] fees in
the amount of $ 17,222.50, because he has prevailed in a civil
proceeding to forfeit property and thus is entitled to fees and costs
under the plain language of CAFRA, and the requested fees are not
unreasonable.
I. BACKGROUND
In April, 2006,
Petitioner Petr Buk gave $ 125,000 to Adrien Pruvot as an investment in
a proposed film production. Mr. Pruvot then deposited that money, and
funds from other sources, into a bank account. Soon thereafter, Mr.
Pruvot and others pled guilty to drug conspiracy and money laundering
charges, and agreed to forfeit the account containing Petitioner's
investment. Following those criminal forfeiture proceedings, Petitioner
filed a petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) n1 asking the government
to return that portion of the account representing his investment. On
August 13, 2007, this Court held, under a theory of constructive trust,
that Petitioner retained equitable title to the money he had invested
with Mr. Pruvot. This Court ordered the United States to return $
125,000 of the seized funds to Petitioner.
FOOTNOTES
n1 21 U.S.C. §
853(n)(2) reads: "Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a
legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the
[*3] United States pursuant to this section may, within thirty
days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under
paragraph (1), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing
to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The
hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury."
Petitioner now
moves for an award of $ 17,322.50 in attorneys' fees under §
2465(b)(1)(A) of CAFRA. The relevant portion of the statute reads:
HN1"in any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of
Federal law in which the claimant substantially prevails, the United
States shall be liable for . . . reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant." 28 U.S.C. §
2465(b)(1)(A).
The parties offer
two competing interpretations of the phrase "any civil proceeding to
forfeit property under any provision of Federal law." The government
argues that Petitioner's petition is not covered by this language, as
"any civil proceeding to forfeit property" is essentially a convoluted
way of saying "civil forfeiture proceeding." Therefore, because the
property in this case was seized under a criminal forfeiture statute,
and [*4] not a civil forfeiture statute, § 2465(b)(1) does
not apply. (Government's Opp'n 2.) Petitioner argues that he is
eligible for fees under the literal text of the statute, because even
though his petition was ancillary to a criminal forfeiture, the hearing
that followed was a civil proceeding in which one party attempted to
forfeit the assets of the another. (Pl.'s Reply 1-2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of
Review
HN2When
interpreting a statute such as CAFRA, the Court's primary purpose is to
"ascertain and implement the intent of Congress." Scott v. United
States, 328 F.3d 132, 138-39 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1998)). The first step
involves determining whether the text has a plain and unambiguous
meaning as applied to the dispute before the Court. Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808
(1997); Scott, 328 F.3d at 139. The individual words in the text are
given their "ordinary, contemporary and common meaning[s]". Scott, 328
F.3d at 139. If this analysis resolves any apparent ambiguity, the
Court's only duty is to "enforce [the statute] according to its terms."
Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 2005) [*5] (internal
quotation omitted).
HN3Where a claimant
is eligible, CAFRA authorizes a court to award "reasonable" attorneys'
fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). To determine if an award is
reasonable, a court must first calculate a "lodestar" figure - the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. United States v. $ 23,400 in United States
Currency, 2007 WL 1080292 (W.D.N.C. Apr., 2007). A court may then
adjust this number up or down to account for unusual circumstances. Id.
In calculating the lodestar figure, a court must take into account the
twelve factors identified by the Fourth Circuit in Daly v. Hill, 790
F.2d 1071, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986). n2
FOOTNOTES
n2 HN4The lodestar
factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to properly
perform the legal service; (4) the preclusion of other employment by
the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) [*6] the 'undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases.
B. Analysis
The Court grants
Petitioner's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, because he has substantially
prevailed in a civil proceeding to forfeit property. The hearing that
followed Mr Buk's § 853(n) petition was a "civil proceeding to
forfeit property" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1); because
he prevailed in that suit, the government is liable for Mr. Buk's
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A).
As there is no
binding authority in the Fourth Circuit regarding the applicability of
CAFRA to forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to 853(n), the Court's
analysis is guided by the text of the statute. Conn. Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992). The
relevant portion of CAFRA reads: "in any civil proceeding to forfeit
property under any provision of Federal law in which the claimant
substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for . . .
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred
by the claimant." 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
HN5It looks to (1) "the language itself," [*7] (2) "the specific
context in which that language is used," and (3) "the broader context
of the statute as a whole" to determine whether the text has a plain
and unambiguous meaning as applied to the dispute before the Court.
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L.
Ed. 2d 808 (1997); Scott, 328 F.3d at 139.
The plain text of
the attorneys' fees provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1), provides
that it is applicable to "any civil proceeding to forfeit property",
under "any provision of Federal law." HN6The Court presumes that the
"legislature says in a statute what it means, and means in a statute
what it says there." Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain 503 U.S. at 253-54,
and under the plain terms of the statute an ancillary proceeding under
21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is such a proceeding. HN7A third-party claimant
to assets seized in a criminal forfeiture may not intervene in the
criminal proceeding, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(2), but must instead file
a petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). The hearing that follows is
civil in nature. See United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that an
ancillary § 853(n) proceeding to recover property seized from
third parties in a criminal forfeiture is a 'civil [*8] action' under
the Equal Access to Justice Act). Because the purpose of the §
853(n) proceeding is to determine if the claimant's property is subject
to government forfeiture, n3 it is literally a "civil proceeding to
forfeit property under [a] provision of Federal law" as described in
§ 2465(b)(1).
FOOTNOTES
n3 When a
third-party asserts an interest in property under § 853(n), the
attempted forfeiture is not perfected until the conclusion of that
proceeding. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(7) ("Following disposition of
all petitions filed under this section, or . . . expiration of the
period provided . . . the United States shall have clear title to
property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture . . .")
(emphasis added).
The Court's
interpretation of section 2465(b)(1) is supported by reference to the
language used elsewhere in CAFRA. If the phrase "civil proceeding to
forfeit property" were interchangeable with "civil forfeiture
proceeding," one would expect to see it used repeatedly in CAFRA. But
it appears only once - in section 2465(b)(1). Throughout the statute,
Congress refers explicitly to "civil forfeiture proceedings," and the
exact phrase "civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture
[*9] statute" appears at least six times. Compare, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C. §
983(e)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 983(h)(1) ("any civil forfeiture proceeding
under a civil forfeiture statute"); with 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)
("any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of
federal law") (emphasis added). Congress's decision to use different
terminology in this single provision, section 2465(b)(1), strongly
suggests that the phrase "civil proceeding to forfeit property" is not
interchangeable with "civil forfeiture proceeding", and that Congress
intended the language in § 2465(b)(1) to convey some different
meaning. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 531, 114 S.
Ct. 1757, 128 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1994) (HN8"It is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.")
(internal quotation omitted); Barmes v. United States, 199 F.3d 386,
389 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Different
language in separate clauses in a statute indicates Congress intended
distinct meanings.") (citation omitted).
The government's
argument to the contrary is summarized [*10] concisely in its
brief - "[b]ecause the forfeiture in this case was brought pursuant to
a criminal forfeiture statute and not a civil forfeiture statute, by
its terms, the CAFRA attorneys' fee provision does not apply."
(Government's Opp'n 2.) However, applicability of the attorneys' fees
provision of CAFRA turns on the status of the claimant and the nature
of the proceeding for which attorneys' fees are sought, not on how the
government chose to initiate the seizure - thus the phrase "under any
provision of Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1) (emphasis
added). There is simply nothing in the language of § 2465(b)(1)
that conditions eligibility on how the government chose to seize the
property. While Congress clearly did not intend to provide attorneys'
fees for defendants to criminal forfeiture proceedings, n4 the text of
the statute does not exclude these defendants based on the nature of
the forfeiture; rather, defendants are ineligible for attorneys' fees
because they were not parties to a civil proceeding as required by
§ 2465(b)(1).
FOOTNOTES
n4 The Court's
interpretation does not conflict with this policy or create a loophole
in the law. Under principles of res judicata, a defendant whose
[*11] property claims have already been adjudicated in a criminal
forfeiture proceeding would not be able to re-litigate them in a civil
proceeding, and thus could not meet the requirements of §
2465(b)(1).
Moreover, the two cases the government cites in support of its argument
are unpersuasive. (See Government's Brief at 2-3) (citing United States
v. Gardiner, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 2007 WL 2462635 (S.D. Fla. 2007);
Synagogue v. United States, 482 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2006)). Gardiner simply echoes the government's construction of CAFRA,
interpreting the phrase "any civil proceeding to forfeit property" as
"any civil forfeiture proceeding" with no further elaboration or
description of its analysis. 512 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 2007 WL 2462635 at
2. Similarly, Synagogue has no bearing on the applicability of CAFRA in
this case. The government cites Synagogue for the proposition that
CAFRA "does not apply where claimant's property is subject to criminal
forfeiture." (Government's Opp'n at 3). However, Petitioner's property
was never subject to criminal forfeiture; his property was subjected to seizure, not
forfeiture. Buk v. United States, No. 1:06cr235 (D. Va. Aug. 13, 2007);
See also United States v. Kahn, 497 F.3d 204, 209 note 6 (2d Cir. 2007) [*12]
(distinguishing literal forfeiture from the legal status of being
"subject to" forfeiture). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
government's argument is without merit.
Because the Court finds that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §
2465(b)(1)(A) applies to Petitioner's proceeding under § 853(n),
and is not persuaded by the governments' arguments, the Court grants
Petitioner's Motion for Attorneys' Fees. Although the assets in
question were originally seized in connection with a criminal
forfeiture, Petitioner was not a party to those proceedings and has not
been accused of any criminal activity. It was only after the conclusion
of the criminal forfeiture that Petitioner filed a petition, pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), to recover the funds he invested in a
proposed film production. As the hearing that followed was a "civil
proceeding to forfeit property under [a] provision of Federal law," and
Petitioner substantially prevailed, the government is liable for his
attorneys' fees under the plain language of the statute. 28 U.S.C.
2465(b)(1)(A).
Having determined that Petitioner is entitled to attorneys' fees under
CAFRA, the Court concludes that $ 17,222.50 is a reasonable fee for
[*13] this case. Petitioner has submitted detailed time sheets
requesting $ 15,437.50 in fees for Partner Stephen J. McCool (47.5
hours at $ 325), $ 1,785.00 for associate Dan McNamara (10.2 hours at $
175), and $ 100 for Westlaw research costs - a total of $ 17,322.50.
(PX1.) The government has not opposed the amount of fees requested. The
Petitioner's attorneys have also submitted an affidavit from a
nationally known forfeiture expert who practices in the Washington
area, attesting to the reasonableness of the rates sought and the hours
expended for this type of litigation. (PX2; Smith Aff. at P 6.) The
Court has reviewed this affidavit and the time sheets for each attorney
and finds an award of $ 17,222.50 reasonable for this litigation. The $
100 requested for Westlaw research will not be permitted, because
research costs are already represented in an attorneys' hourly rate.
III. Conclusion
The Court grants Petitioner's Motion for Attorneys' Fees in the amount
of $ 17,222.50. The hearing that followed Petitioner's § 853(n)
petition constituted a "civil proceeding to forfeit property" under 28
U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1). Because Petitioner substantially prevailed in
that proceeding, the government [*14] is liable for his
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the plain language of the
CAFRA attorneys' fees provision. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Petitioner Petr Buk's Motion for Attorneys' Fees is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58, in favor of Petitioner Petr Buk, and
against Defendant United States of America in the amount of $
17,222.50. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant United States of America pay Petitioner Petr Buk
attorneys' fees in the amount of $ 17,222.50.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Order to counsel of
record.
ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2008.
/s/ Gerald Bruce Lee
Gerald Bruce Lee
United States District Judge
Alexandria, Virginia
3/25/08
...In $227,000, 69 F.3d at 1498, an opinion that predates the enactment of CAFRA by about 5 years, we held that sovereign immunity does not bar a claim against the United States for interest on wrongfully seized money. In reaching our conclusion, we acknowledged the general rule "that 'interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the government in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity.' " Id. at 1493 (quoting Library of Congress v. Shaw, 4789 U.S. 310, 311 (1986)). But we characterized that rule as applicable to "inchoate interest, as an item of damages in a forfeiture action." Id. at 1497. By contrast, we explained, the payment of interest on wrongfully seized money is not a payment of damages, but instead is the disgorgement of a benefit "actually and calculably received from an asset that [the government] has been holding improperly. Id. at 1498. As a result, no express waiver of sovereign immunity was necessary, and the plaintiff was entitled to the payment of interest actually or constructively earned by the government during the period the asset was wrongfully held. Id.The United States first requests that we read into $227,000, as the district court did, the requirement of a court order before interest accrues on improperly seized money. Under such an interpretation, Plaintiff would not be entitled to interest because the United States eventually returned Plaintiff's money without a court order. ...Interest earned, whether actually or constructively, is part of the res that must be returned to the owner. Id. at 1496. Had the district court's order of the return of the money served as a trigger for a right to interest, we would have ruled in $227,000 that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from the date of that order. Instead, we held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest accruing from a date eight years earlier. Id. We reasoned from the common law: "If the government seized . . . a pregnant cow and was ultimately found not to be entitled to the cow after it had given birth, it could hardly be contended that the government had fulfilled its duty by returning the now-barren cow, but retaining the calf." Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, the plaintiff had a right to the interest even in the absence of a court order and, moreover, the right existed in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity.The United States' voluntary return of Plaintiff's $75,800, along with its concession that it did not have a right to the money, obviated the need for a court order to that effect. Under the government's rationale, the United States could avoid the disgorgement of interest--no matter how long it wrongfully held funds--by voluntarily returning seized money at the very last minute before such order is entered. ...[[[ The United States next argued that CAFRA's 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(A) supersedes $227,000 and does not provide for the return of interest in a case such as this, where the government declined to initiate judicial proceedings against the res, but failed comply with its obligation to return such property to its owner within the statutory deadline of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3). --J.O.]]]... Our holding is also consistent with the concerns expressed by Congress in CAFRA's legislative history. When it enacted CAFRA, Congress acknowledged a circuit split that arose in the wake of our decision in $227,000.* ... H.R. Rep. No. 106-192, at 19 nt. 79 (1999). Although Congress did not state that the legislation was resolving that split, it did find the denial of interest to a property owner who prevailed in a forfeiture action to be "manifestly unfair." Id. at 19. The Sixth Circuit stated that CAFRA "ratified the outcome, if not the rationale" of our decision in $227,000. Permitting the United States to retain the proverbial calf would be inconsistent with our holding in $227,000...Considering the text of CAFRA, the overall statutory scheme, and the legislative history, we hold that $227,000 remains good law. That being so, the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiff's claim for interest on the $75,800 seized by the United States."
2nd Cir gives expansive reading to reach
of criminal forfeiture: U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, January 30,
2008 Conviction
on a variety of arson and fraud charges is affirmed over claim that 28
U.S.C. section 2461(c)(2005) did not authorize the criminal forfeiture
of the proceeds of his mail and wire fraud offenses. Read more...
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, December
21, 2007
U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, November
19, 2007
US v. Cardona-Sandoval,
No. 07-1748
Order denying a motion for the return of property seized at the time of
defendant's arrest is vacated where the government's response to the
motion was not adequate to support the district court's decision since:
1) the government's response failed to address the status of the
property specified; 2) the government provided the court with no
information identifying how and when defendant was notified of the
property's impending destruction and given the opportunity to receive
it; and 3) what assertions the government did make were not supported
by evidence. Read more...
US v. Schlesinger, No.
05-3021
US v. Plunk, No. 06-35269
In property forfeiture proceedings brought against defendant in
connection with his conviction for drug-related offenses, a decision
awarding defendant compensation in lieu of property to be returned
under 28 U.S.C. section 2465 and calculating the amount due based on
the sale proceeds of the property is affirmed where: 1) contrary to
defendant's claim, section 2465 does not require that he receive
consequential damages; and 2) there was no error in the lower court's
calculation of damages. Read more...
Bailey v. US, No. 07-40309
Dismissal of defendant's motion seeking the return of property seized
from him at his arrest and a grant of the government's motion to
dismiss are affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) under the
circumstances, the government's written notice was reasonably
calculated to provide defendant with notice and there was no due
process violation arising out of the forfeiture; 2) however, there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the government has, or
ever had, certain claimed monies, which were not forfeited, in its
possession; and 3) to the extent defendant sought the return of
additional personal property seized from him at his arrest, his claim
was untimely. Read more...